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ABSTRACT
Mortgage interest tax deductibility is needed to treat debt and equity financing of homes equally.
Countries that limit deductibility create a debt tax penalty that presumably leads households to shift
from debt toward equity financing. The greater the shift, the less is the tax revenue raised by the
limitation and smaller is its negative impact on housing demand. Measuring the financing response
to a legislative change is complicated by the fact that lenders restrict mortgage debt to the value of
the house (or slightly less) being financed. Taking this restriction into account reduces the estimated
financing response by 20 percent (a 32 percent decline in debt vs a 40 percent decline). The
estimation is based on 86,000 newly originated UK loans from the late 1990s.
Patric H. Hendershott















The Sensitivity of Household Leverage to the Deductibility of Home 
Mortgage Interest 
 
  In many economies debt financing of housing is penalized relative to equity financing, i.e., interest 
payments are not fully tax deductible.  In the Commonwealth countries – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the UK (since 1999) – interest is not deductible; in most European countries (the UK in the quarter 
century prior to 1999) interest is only partially deductible, being limited by a ceiling on the deductible 
amount, application of a lower tax rate to the deduction, or both.  As a result, the Modigliani-Miller (1958) 
debt neutrality theorem does not hold; the user cost of capital for owner-occupied housing (through the 
weighted average cost of capital) is not independent of LTV choice.
1  Knowing how LTVs respond to 
deductibility limits is thus crucial to understanding how housing choices will be affected by changes in 
such limits. 
There are two fundamental problems in explaining LTV behavior.  First, the tax penalty on debt 
usage depends on intricate tax law provisions and the level of debt usage itself.  For example, in the UK 
during the decade 1983-92, there was a penalty only for loan amounts above £30,000, and between 1993 
and 1999 for some households there was also a penalty for loans below £30,000.  In the U.S., a penalty 
exists for some low-income households, households with low mortgage debt living in states with low house 
prices and low taxation, and quite high-income households.  Thus estimating the penalty for individual 
households is complicated.  Second, it is almost a universal law that LTVs on newly-originated loans are 
bounded between (are truncated/censored at) zero and one (debt is bounded between zero and house value).  
Moreover, initial LTVs of first-time home buyers are highly skewed toward the highest lender-permitted 
LTV (Hendershott, Pryce and White, 2003), while as many as half of older homeowners have zero LTVs 
(Ling and McGill, 1998).  The upper bound of unity or the lender-permitted maximum constitutes credit 
rationing.  Because the economic response to a debt penalty is to reduce debt, the more a borrower is 
rationed, the less his response to a given penalty will be.  The combined effect of LTVs suffering from both 
truncation and a highly skewed distribution creates substantial modeling problems. 
                                                 




This paper addresses these complications and modeling problems.  We incorporate the simultaneity 
of the decision to borrow more or less than the £30,000 threshold by using a “two stage least squares” type 
approach, running a probit regression to estimate the probability of being above the ceiling and then using 
the predicted probabilities of paying penalties above and below the ceiling in an instrumental variables 
approach to estimate the effect of the tax penalty on LTV.  The fundamental truncation/censoring of 
observed LTVs is addressed by employing truncated regression (Maddala, 1992, 342-44) and censored 
regression (Amemiya 1973) to model the unrationed response to a tax penalty.   These results are then 
contrasted with responses estimated in credit rationing regime where the LTV is bounded by zero and one.  
We arrive at the constrained rersponses by utilizing Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) “Fractional Response” 
estimation. 
We employ the UK data set of Hendershott, Pryce and White (2003).  These data are especially 
useful because they are a random sample of all house purchasers who made a deliberate leverage decision.  
Thus we do not need to be concerned with lagged responses of existing mortgagees to changes in the debt 
penalty and other variables.  We illustrate how different estimation methodologies affect estimates of the 
sensitivity of LTV choice to a debt tax penalty.  We then simulate mortgage demand with full deductibility 
and with zero deductibility and compute the impact of shifting from full to zero deductibility. 
The paper is divided into seven sections.  We begin with a discussion of the debt tax penalty and 
some earlier LTV research.  Section 2 contains our econometric model.  Section 3 discusses estimation 
alternatives to ordinary least squares.  Section 4 presents the data, and section 5 reports the results.  Section 
6 uses simulation analysis to compute the percentage decrease in debt usage in response to removal of 




1.  The Debt Tax Penalty and Earlier Research on Mortgage Debt Usage 
 
Home mortgage interest deductibility is a means of extending the fundamental tax advantage of 
owner-occupied housing, the nontaxation of the implicit rents owners pay to themselves and the low (often 
zero) taxation of capital gains, to households who use debt finance.  Deductibility does not make debt 
cheaper than equity; rather it maintains tax equality between the two costs. Thus to the extent that the 
interest deduction is limited, there is a tax cost or penalty to using debt and one would expect debt usage to 
be less. 
Mortgage interest has never been fully deductible in the US.  Low income households or 
households with low mortgage debt living in states with low house prices and low taxation (state taxes and 
mortgage interest are the two largest deductible expenses) would select not to itemize expenses because 
taking the standard deduction instead would lower their taxes (Ling and McGill, 1998).  For these 
households there is effectively no deductibility.  Further, even if a household did itemize, not all mortgage 
interest was effectively deductible (the amount of interest that raised total deductible expenses to the 
standard deduction was “wasted”).  The amount of wasted interest (and the number of households that 
chose not to itemize) grew following the 1986 tax act for two reasons (Hendershott, Follain and Ling, 
1987).  First, a number of expenses that were previously deductible could no longer be itemized, probably 
the most important being the interest on consumer credit debt.  Second, the standard deduction was sharply 
increased.  Finally, the 1986 act also phased out itemized deductions when household income rose above 
threshold levels, limiting deductibility for very high income households to as little as 20 percent of their 
interest paid. 
Follain, Ling, and various associates have used the change in the effective deductibility of 
mortgage interest induced by the 1986 tax act to test the hypothesis that household leverage is sensitive to 
the tax penalty on debt (Follain and Ling, 1991, Ling and McGill, 1998, Follain and Dunsky, 1997, and 
Dunsky and Follain, 2000).  In each case, the leverage of individual households was found to be related 
significantly to the effective deductibility of mortgage interest.  Using the Dunsky and Follain estimates, 




deduction (MID) would lower mortgage debt by 41 percent.  We note that this estimate is based on removal 
relative to 1988 US tax law, not removal relative to full interest deductibility.  The latter would be an even 
larger percentage decline in mortgage debt.  This work on US data requires forecasting various unavailable 
household expenses and determining whether households would itemize or take the standard deduction.  
Moreover, the empirical analysis is not of households at their decision point (when the loan is originated), 
but wherever they happen to be in the debt cycle, including whether they have a below-market, fixed-rate 
mortgage (which would obviously dampen borrower incentives to reduce debt). 
The tax penalty argument can be formalized in the following way.  In general, the weighted 
average cost of capital for owner-occupied housing is just an average of the debt (CD) and equity (CE) 
costs where the weights are the loan to value ratio, LTV, and 1-LTV: 
 
 WACC  =  (LTV)CD  +  (1-LTV)CE.        (1) 
 
If both costs equal the after-tax interest rate, (1-T)r, then WACC = (1-T)r (we abstract from risk premia).  
However, if a tax penalty at rate p is imposed on debt usage, its cost is (1-T+p)r and 
 
 WACC  =  (1-T)r  +  LTVrp.         (2) 
 
If the penalty is the nondeductibility of interest, p = T and the WACC is increased by the product LTVTr. 
How much removal of the MID would raise the WACC (and tax revenue) depends on how much 
households change their LTV in response to the loss of deductibility.  The more households reduce their 
LTVs, the less the WACC is increased and thus the less will be the reduction in homeownership and 
housing demand.  Also, the less revenue the government would gain by removing the MID. 
UK borrowers have also been subject to substantially greater variation in limitations on interest 
deductibility than US borrowers.  During the last quarter century, the mortgage interest deduction in the 




(and the deductibility of interest on other household debt was eliminated).  In 1983, the limit was raised to 
£30,000 (the median UK house price level had nearly tripled to £29,400).  Subsequently the limit was never 
again raised in spite of rising house prices (the median tripled again to £87,300 in 1999).  Second, the 
maximum tax rate at which interest could be deducted was cut from the 40 percent maximum income tax 
rate to 25 percent in 1992, to 20 percent in 1994, and to 10 percent in 1995 (finally to zero in 1999).  Given 
that there were effectively only two household income tax brackets during this period, 25 and 40 percent, 
after 1993 no household paying taxes could deduct mortgage interest at their full marginal income tax rate. 
Of the ceiling and tax rate maximums, the former has been far more important for new borrowers 
who have reasonably high initial loan-to-value ratios (the average of our sample is 0.78).  With a median 
house price in 1995-98 of £53,000 outside the London/Southeast region and £76,000 within this region, 
over four-fifths of new mortgage originations were above the £30,000 mortgage limit and thus interest was 
not deductible at all on the margin. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the debt tax penalty varied with loan size.  The products of a given interest 
rate and the tax rate are on the vertical axis and loan amount is on the horizontal.  The solid line is a 
household’s marginal tax rate times the given interest rate.  Holding house value constant, the larger is the 
mortgage loan, the more interest is deductible (unless the loan is above the ceiling, Lc), but the larger are 
the household’s taxable investments and thus the higher is its taxable interest income.  As long as the 
ceiling isn’t binding, taxable income is at least roughly independent of loan size.
2  The dashed rT* line in 
the figure is the product of the given interest rate and the lower maximum tax rate, introduced in 1993, at 
which mortgage interest on the loan amount below the ceiling could be deducted.  The tax penalty for loans 
above Lc is the product of the household’s tax rate and the interest rate (Tr).  The penalty below the ceiling 
is the product of the interest rate and the maximum of T-T* or zero (the latter for households with T < T*).  
The difference T-T* is independent of loan size.
3  
                                                 
2 When the loan exceeds the ceiling, the larger is the loan (and thus taxable investments), the higher is the household’s 
taxable income.  Thus at some point the household could be pushed into a higher tax bracket. 
3 These tax penalties, Tr and (T-T*)r, also apply to some U.S. borrowers, but the application is much different.  
Whereas the Tr penalty applies to large loans in the UK, in the US it applies only if the loan is sufficiently small that 




[Figure 1.  The Debt Tax Penalty] 
Let ψ be the probability that a borrower’s loan will exceed the tax deductibility ceiling of £30,000, 
we have 
 
WACC = (1-T)r + (LTV)Trψ + LTV(T-T*)r(1-ψ) .       ( 2 ’ )  
 
Hendershott, Pryce and White (2003) estimated ψ for individual households and then made the log of LTV 
a function of two tax penalty variables, p
A and p
B, where the A and B refer to penalties applying to loans 
above and below the loan ceiling, which are defined as the second and third terms in equation (2’) divided 
by LTV.  The log of LTV was significantly negatively related to both penalty variables.   
  There are two problems with that estimation.  First is the obvious negative correlation of the two 
variables owing to the complementary of the ψ  and 1-ψ  terms.  Second is the use of predicted loan size 
(above or below £30,000) in explaining LTV.  Smaller loans are likely to carry lower LTVs and thus the 
estimated negative impact of the penalty on small loans will be biased upward relative to that on large 
loans.  In this paper, we first estimate ψ  and thus the two penalty variables.  We then obtain a single tax 
penalty variable, p




2.  Econometric Model 
 
A household’s demand for mortgage debt is driven by its consumption demand for housing relative 
to its wealth and the tax penalty.  At one extreme are households with sufficient wealth relative to housing 
consumption demand that they demand zero mortgage debt.  At the other extreme are households with a 
sufficiently high consumption demand relative to wealth that they select the maximum debt allowed by 
lenders (Hendershott, Lafayette and Haurin, 1997).  In the more general case, households are trading off the 
                                                                                                                                                                
T*)r penalty applies to small loans in the UK, in the US it exists only for households with income sufficiently high 




debt penalty against portfolio diversification considerations (Brueckner, 1994).  More debt is relatively 
expensive, but it allows the holding of additional nonhousing assets. 
Given the constraints of zero and unity (or slightly less) on the LTV and its importance to the 
WACC, the LTV is a natural focal point for investigation.  However, because the demand for debt is not 
necessarily homogenous of degree one in housing demand, determinants of this demand, such as real 
income and real house prices, are relevant to LTV choice.
4  Other determinants are variables that place 
households on the need to diversify spectrum.  In the absence of a wealth measure, these include borrower 
age and whether or not they previously owned their home. 
The diversification benefits of a higher LTV decrease with the level of the LTV; the lower the 
LTV, the more diversified the household would be.  Thus the response of households to the debt penalty, 
the cost of greater diversification, should be greater the lower the LTV would be in the absence of the 
penalty.  For example, the response should be greater for previous owners and for those in areas with lower 
real house prices.  As a result, we partition our sample along these lines to see how the response to the 
penalty varies. 
Following the above discussion LTV depends on basic or wage income (Y
B
i), other income (Y
O
i), 
the borrower’s age (AGEi), whether the borrower was a previous owner (POi), the debt tax penalty (pi
C) and 
a vector of location and year dummy variables (DUMi).  Thus the structural equations of the 
econometric model are: 
 





C, DUMi,)       (3) 
pi
C = pi
C [LTViTirψ i, LTVi (Ti-T
*)r(1-ψ i) ]       ( 4 )  
where 




i, AGEi ,LTVi , DUMi)       ( 5 )  





                                                 
4 Most of the recent literature explains the quantity of mortgage debt and housing demand in a simultaneous equation 
framework (Follain and Dunsky, 1997, and Ling and McGill, 1998).  Our formulation avoids the necessity of 





*      =    the maximum marginal tax rate at which interest can be deducted (equal to 0.1 
during the period under consideration). 
 
 
Re-writing (4) in terms of its underlying variables yields: 
 
pi




i, AGEi, r, LTVi , T
* , DUMi) .        ( 4 ’ )  
 
As is shown in Appendix A, the parameters in the LTV equation are exactly identified.  While those in the 
tax penalty equation are not, we are not interested in those coefficients. 
Our estimation of LTV follows a two-stage least squares instrumental variables rationale in that we 
control for simultaneity of LTV and p
C by using the predicted values from a regression of the right hand 
side endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in the system (see Greene, 2003, p. 398).  This process 
is complicated by the fact that neither LTV nor p
C is necessarily estimated using OLS (we also use 
truncated/censored regression and FLR estimation techniques for explaining LTV, and p
C is derived 
indirectly from a probit estimate of ψ).
 5 
3. Estimation Alternatives 
 
Our econometric estimation is complicated by the possible credit rationing that arises from lenders 
placing an upper bound on LTV at (or near) one.  In perfectly informed credit markets we would 
not expect either equilibrium credit rationing or collateral constraints of the kind described respectively by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Bester (1987), and OLS regression would provide unbiased estimates.  But 
this is not the world we live in.  Even beyond the bias issue, the high LTVs of many borrowers in our 
sample implies that removing the tax penalty will likely predict LTVs over 100 percent for many 
                                                 
5 In a world where mortgage interest is not tax deductible, the marginal tax rate paid by a household can depend on the 
LTV choosen.  To illustrate, for a given house purchase, the larger the loan choosen, the more wealth the household 
has to invest in other assets and thus the higher is the taxable income of the household.  To eliminate this source of 
endogeneity, we add an estimate of the interest a household could earn on their equity investment in the house to the 
income of the household before computing their marginal tax rate. The estimate is computed as the product of the 




borrowers.  Thus more sophisticated estimation techniques are needed if we want to estimate the 
constrained response. 
In this section we consider a number of alternatives to OLS.  First, we discuss Truncated and 
Censored Regression.  The latter is an extension of the well-known Tobit estimation.  While these address 
the issue of estimation bias, they do not deal with the issue of predictions above the maximum lender 
allowed LTV.  Second, we describe Fractional Logit Regression and how we will use it to address both 
estimation bias and prediction constraints. 
Truncated and Censored Regression 
Some households that would be homeowners in the absence of a lender constraint on LTV will not 
be owners owing to the constraints.  Figure 2 (adapted from Maddala 1992, p. 343), illustrates the bias that 
can result from excluding these potential borrowers – the OLS line in this case is shallower (i.e., the LTV 
variable is less responsive to changes in the tax penalty) than what it would be if we had information on the 
excluded applicants.  The Truncated Regression (TR) model attempts to correct for the bias that results 
from applying OLS to samples drawn from a truncated distribution. 
         [Figure 2 Impact of Excluded Borrowers: Correcting for Truncation Bias] 
Let the simple OLS regression model be denoted as 
 y* = βxi + ui   ui ~IN(0,σ
2), 
If observations are only included in the sample if y* ≤ a, where a is the value of y at which truncation 
occurs, then the total area under the normal curve up to y* < a is F[(a – βx)/σ], where F(.) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution (Maddala, 1992, p. 343).  The probability density function of the observed yi 
(i.e. those included in our sample) is assumed by the TR model to be the standard normal density for this 
total area:  “Since the total area under a probability density function should be equal to 1, we have to 
normalize by this factor” (ibid).  This entails dividing the probability density function for yi by the area up 
to the truncation point.  The log-likelihood function that results is identical to the maximum likelihood 




Note also the implications of using TR to predict what LTVs will be when the tax penalty is zero.  
Because dLTV/d p
C < 0, removal of the tax penalty will result in a rise in LTV, causing the upper bound on 
LTV to bind in a greater number of cases.  So, in principle at least, the predicted values from 
the TR regression for p
C = 0 will be estimates of what the LTVs would be if there were no upper bound on 
LTV.  That is, neither TR nor OLS, constrains predicted, in the absence of a tax penalty, LTVs to be less 
than the maximum.  We need an estimation method that will allow us to predict within the bounded range 
of values of LTV.   
The TR model is more general than the Tobit model.  Maddala explains that, “In the censored 
regression model (tobit model) we have observations on the explanatory variable xi for all individuals.  It is 
only the dependent variable yi
* that is missing for some individuals.  In the TR model, we have no data on 
either yi
* or xi for some individuals because no samples are drawn if yi
* is below or above some level” 
(Maddala, 1992, p. 342).  Truncated regression accounts for bias that might result from borrowers choosing 
not to be homeowners because they cannot obtain their desired LTV.   
However, a more likely response for households where the benefits of owning with unrestricted 
lending over renting are large is to take y’, the maximum LTV on offer, even if this is below their optimum.  
If this were the case and rationing were common, we would expect to see many observations with LTVs 
exactly equal to the maximum.  In terms of the above notation, the latent variable y* is observed if y* < y’ 
and is not observed if y* ≥ y’ even though the values of the explanatory variables are observed.  The 
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The basic Tobit model has limited usefulness when applied to our data because less than one 
percent of observations (850 cases out of 86,620 records) have LTVs exactly equal to one (when we 
applied Tobit to our data, coefficients and predicted values unsurprisingly were virtually identical to OLS 
estimates).  Note that the low incidence of observations with LTVs exactly equal to one is not necessarily 
indicative of the absence of censoring.  While some lenders may set the global maximum LTV at unity, 
others will set a maximum below this level, possibly based on their perception of the creditworthiness of 
the borrower concerned.  Indeed, we find two lower cut-points, 0.95 and 0.90, with 15,254 and 3,848 cases 
having LTVs exactly equal to these thresholds, respectively. Together these cut-points represent 22 percent 
of our total sample.  If a significant proportion of these observations are the result of credit rationing, rather 
than because borrowers choose to be at these points because of piecewise nature of mortgage pricing, then 
we still need to account for the censoring of the dependent variable.
6  We do this by applying Amemiya’s 
(1973) Censored Regression model (CR) which is a generalized version of Tobit regression that allows for 
variable cutoffs (in our case, at LTVs of 1.00, 0.95, and 0.90).  While Censored Regression will help us 
ascertain what the parameters of our model would be in the absence of rationing (and hence predict what 
the unconstrained LTV would be), like OLS and TR, the predicted CR values can exceed one. 
Fractional Logit Regression 
A popular way of modeling variables bounded between zero and one is to apply the log-odds 
transformation to the dependent variable (log[y/(1-y)]) which allows OLS to be applied to the estimation of 
xβ.  This approach has two major drawbacks for the estimation of LTVs which can take on the extreme 
values of zero and (in the UK at least) unity: 
“First, it cannot be used directly if y takes on the boundary values, zero and one.  While we can 
always use adjustments for the boundary values, such adjustments are necessarily arbitrary.  
Second, even if y is strictly inside the unit interval, β is difficult to interpret: without further 
assumptions, it is not possible to recover an estimate of E(y|x), and with further assumptions, it is 
still nontrivial to estimate E(y|x).” (Wooldridge, 2002, p.662). 
 
                                                 
6 We find little evidence of a straightforward positive relationship between the interest rates charged on mortgage 
contracts and LTVs.  A simple regression of the mortgage interest rate on LTV reveals that there is no significant 
positive correlation between the two variables.  Indeed, the average rate for 95 percent LTVs is a half basis point less 




The solution suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Wooldridge (2002) is to model E(y|x) as a 
logistic function:   )] exp( 1 /[ ) exp( ) | ( E xβ xβ x + = y   
This method guarantees that “predicted values for y are in (0,1) and that the effect of any xi on 
E(y|x) diminishes as  ∞ → x .”  (Wooldridge, 2002, p.662).  The effect is illustrated in Figure 3 where it can 
be seen that OLS tends to predict outside the [0,1] range at the extremes, whereas the recumbent “S” shape 
of the FLR fitted line ensures that the LTV constraints are binding for predicted values.  Fully robust 
variance matrix estimates are derived by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) by applying the formulas from the 
dichotomous dependent variable case.  It is this method, then, that is applied here, estimated using quasi-
maximum likelihood and compared with the other estimation methods.  Because the LTV regression is part 
of a simultaneous equation system and the right-hand-side endogenous variable (the debt tax penalty) 
enters non-linearly, the usual 2SLS standard errors are unlikely to apply to our OLS estimates.  Thus we 
report the bootstrapped standard errors (based on 1,000 repetitions) for all regression results, rather than the 
2SLS standard errors or those suggested by Papke and Wooldridge in the single equation context for FLR.
7 
[Figure 3  Constrained Response: Predicting with the [0,1] Interval] 
 
4.  Data 
The empirical analysis is based on over eighty-six thousand observations extracted from the 
Council for Mortgage Lenders’ annual survey of 5% of all mortgage originations over the period 1995 to 
1998 (see Hendershott, Pryce and White 2003 for details).  Because variable descriptives and regression 
coefficients tended to be noticeably different for London and the Southeast compared with the remaining 
Other regions, we present two sets of results in each table.  Variable definitions and descriptives are 
presented in Table 1 (i) for London/SE and in Table 1 (ii) for Other.  If a variable is continuous, we present 
the mean, median, and coefficient of variation (the standard deviation as a proportion of the mean); if a 
variable is dichotomous, we present the proportion.  Notice that the mean house price is almost 50 percent 
higher in the London/SE region than elsewhere, and income is 30 percent higher.  As a result of the former, 
                                                 




the proportion of loans above £30000 is much greater, 90 percent in London/SE versus 77 percent in Other.  
Half of all loans have LTVs of 89 percent or higher. 
  Table 2 divides the two area samples by age, buyer status (first time owners, FTOs, and previous 
owners, POs), and the tax rate paid, either 0.23 to 0.25 or 0.4.  Of course, FTOs are younger than POs; 
nearly four-fifths of FTOs are under age 35, while only two-fifths of POs are.  Conversely, less than a tenth 
of FTOs are over age 44, versus a quarter of POs.  Holding age constant, POs have higher incomes than 
FTOs and are thus more likely to be paying the higher 40 percent tax rate. This is especially true because 
the POs, being older and having higher incomes, have greater imputed income on equity invested in the 
house.  These statements are equally valid for those in the London/SE as those living elsewhere. 
The mean LTVs for each age/tax-rate cell are also listed.  As expected, LTVs decline with age and 
are lower for POs.  The age impact is far less for FTOs than POs; LTVs decline by 0.17 (London/SE, low 
tax rate) and 0.20 (Other, low tax rate) between under age 25 to over 54 for FTOs versus declines of 0.35 
(London/SE) and 0.39 (Other) for POs.  Finally, as expected, LTVs are lower for borrowers in the higher 
(0.4) tax bracket, although this is not true for the oldest PO households. 
 
5. Equation  Estimates 
    The probit equations for loans above £30,000 are listed in Appendix B (Table B1) and are 
estimated separately for the London/SE and the Other regions.  These regressions were used to predict the 
probability of exceeding the £30,000 ceiling, and this probability was used to compute the tax penalty 
variables above and below the ceiling (p
A = Trψ  and p
B = max(T – 0.1, 0)r(1- ψ ), respectively).  We then 
predict the household tax penalty from a regression of the actual tax penalty on p
A and p
B, the results of 
which are reported in the second table of the Appendix (Table B2).  The adjusted R
2 of this regression for 
the London/SE region is 0.91, while the predictive power is 0.82 for the Other regions.  The higher relative 
power is due to the higher percentage of loans above £30,000. 
Table 3 presents the LTV regressions for previous owners and first-time owners using the different 




which implies that correcting for censoring has the same effect as correcting for truncation.  The tax penalty 
variable is highly statistically significant (t-ratios, in parentheses, range from 10 to 35), irrespective of the 
regression technique (OLS, CR, and FLR) employed, as are basic income, other income, and age.  As for 
the OLS and CR/TR tax-penalty coefficients, we anticipated that the OLS coefficient would be biased 
towards zero due to the omission of totally constrained borrowers from the CML data (i.e., households who 
were unable to obtain a mortgage at the minimum LTV needed to purchase a dwelling that would yield 
greater utility than their current dwelling).  This is confirmed: the OLS coefficients are smaller in absolute 
terms than the CR/TR coefficients in both the previous owner and first time buyer regressions for both the 
London/SE and Other regions (and are significantly smaller in three of four cases).  Note also that the tax-
penalty responses under the OLS and CR estimations for first-time buyers are roughly half those for 
previous owners.  This, too, was expected given the younger age, and thus lower accumulated wealth, of 
first-time buyers. 
Because the FLR coefficients are not the first partial derivatives (due to the non-linear structure of 
the logit functional form), they cannot be directly compared with the OLS and CR coefficients.  We note, 
though, that here, too, the responses of previous owners are significantly greater than those of first-time 
owners. 
  Figure 4 illustrates the general fit of the equations by comparing the kernel density function of the 
predicted values of our three estimation techniques with the kernel density plot of the actual values of 
LTV.
8  Note that none of the estimation techniques explains the extreme concentration of LTVs at or above 
0.95 (almost a third of our sample), although the CR method seems to do a marginally better job.  On the 
other hand, the CR method predicts a number of LTVs greater than unity.  The OLS and FLR methods have 
quite similar distributions of predicted values. 
[Figure 4 LTV Kernel Density Plots] 
 
                                                 
8  “Kernel density estimation” is the term used to describe a series of algorithms for approximating the density 
function of an observed distribution.  We use the standard Epanechnikov kernel with a halfwidth (the width of the 




6.    Simulated Impact of Removing the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) 
During our estimation period all borrowers effectively had partial interest deductibility.  To 
compute the impact on debt usage of shifting from full deductibility to no deductibility (or vice versa) then 
requires two simulations: one to determine what LTVs would be with full deductibility (no tax penalty) and 
another to determine LTVs with zero deductibility (tax penalty equal to Tr).  The percentage reduction in 
LTV owing to the loss of interest deductibility is then computed as the difference between the latter 
simulated value and the former, times 100, divided by the former. 
Table 4 reports mean percentage declines in LTV resulting from removal of the MID predicted by 
each of the three estimation methods for each of the cells in Table 2.  The percentage decline is greatest 
(across all estimation methods) for older borrowers (particularly previous owners) because their LTV is 
lower at the outset (full deductibility) so the same absolute fall in LTV will have a larger percentage effect.  
The percentage declines for previous owners are roughly double those for first time owners (less than 
double for young households according to the FLR estimation and somewhat more for older households 
according to OLS estimation).  This follows directly from the larger tax penalty coefficients in Table 3.  
Predicted percentage decreases are also greater for households in the 40 percent tax bracket than those in 
the 23-25 percent brackets (not that much greater for older households).  This is again as expected because 
the former are having a larger tax penalty removed.  Finally, predicted decreases are quite similar for the 
London/SE and Other regions. 
Regarding the estimation method, the CR method consistently has estimates 20 percent higher than 
OLS for FTOs and 5 to 10 percent higher for POs, which is consistent with the argument that the OLS 
estimates are biased downward.  FLR, on the other hand, gives smaller percentages than OLS or CR for 
those under age 44 and larger increases for older borrowers (larger than CR only for households over age 
54).  The reason for the smaller FLR predictions for younger borrowers is clear from Figure 5, which gives 
the predicted LTV distributions for the three estimation methods with full interest deductibility.  The OLS 
and CR predictions have many borrowers with LTVs greater than unity, considerably greater in the case of 




On the other hand, the FLR estimated response exceeds the OLS estimated response for borrowers 
with moderate initial LTVs, and for whom the upper limit on debt gearing is unlikely to bind.  While the 
OLS slope is restricted to be the same for all values of the independent variable, the FLR slope is not.  This 
is clear from Figure 3 where the central section of the FLR curve is steeper than the OLS line.  And older 
borrowers in our sample are much more likely to lie on this section of the curve than are younger 
borrowers.  
 
[Figure 5 LTV Kernel Density Plots for Full Deductibility] 
 
The impact of removal of the MID is much greater for POs than for FTOs and is again estimated to 
be much larger by the FLR method.  Younger households have less wealth and are thus less able to reduce 
debt in response to a debt tax penalty.  Moreover, most of the OLS and CR predictions of LTVs above 
unity are for younger borrowers.  And POs have likely accumulated more wealth than FTOs. 
Next we calculate the aggregate mortgage debt of borrowers both with and without interest 
deductibility implied by the three estimation techniques.   Here we multiply the predicted LTVs with 
(without) deductibility for each household by its house value to get the predicted loan size (capped at the 
house value in the FLR prediction) with (without) deductibility.  Then we compute the averages for each of 
the cells in Table 2 and multiply them by the relevant weights for each cell.  Adding these products gives 
the average loan size with and without interest deductibility, respectively.  The percentage decline in 
average loan size is obtained by dividing the difference between the averages with and without 
deductibility (times 100) by the average with full deductibility.  This is also the percentage decline in 
aggregate mortgage debt due to the removal of the MID. 
Two sets of weights are given in Table 5.  Each set distributes homeowners into three age classes 
(<35, 35-44, >44), allowing for FTOs and POs as well as low and high tax brackets.  The first set is based 
on our origination data in Table 2 and is derived directly from the counts in that table.  These weights are 
necessarily skewed toward young, mobile households who do most loan origination.  To compute the 




new borrowers.  The second set of weights is based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which 
is based on a representative sample of British households.
9   
As can be seen, a full 96 percent weight is applied to previous owners in the 40 percent tax bracket.  
Because most owners have been in their houses for many years (the average age of previous owners is 42.3 
years in the BHPS sample versus 34.6 years in the new originators sample), incomes are higher in the 
BHPS sample.  Further, the average LTV for the BHPS sample is only 0.61 versus the 0.78 in the CML 
sample.  Recall that the tax calculation is based on income including an estimate of the income that would 
have been earned if the household were not a homeowner, i.e., the product of the mortgage interest rate and 
the difference between the current house value and the loan balance is added to other income.
10  This 
imputation pushes many more BHPS than CML households into the 40 percent tax bracket).  In the absence 
of this imputation, only 50.2 percent of POs in the BHPS sample would be in the top tax bracket. 
The aggregate percentage debt declines from removing the MID based on OLS, CR, and FLR are 
listed in Table 6 for the two sets of weights.  Using the loan origination weights, the aggregate debt decline 
is 17 to 23 percent.  Using the homeowner population weights, the responses rise to 32 to 41 percent.  The 
latter, our CR estimate, is identical to the 41 percent simulated aggregate decline based on analysis of US 
data obtained by Follain and Melamed (1998)
11  What we wish to emphasize, though, is the 20 percent 
lower FLR estimate of 32 percent.  This lower response is attributable to capping the simulated LTVs with 
full MID at unity.  As just shown, OLS and CR simulated values with the MID often exceeded unity.  Thus 
the reductions from removal of the MID based upon these estimations are greater than those based on FLR.  
                                                 
9 We extracted a subsample of mortgage borrowers four years (1995-1998) of BHPS data which we treated as repeat 
cross sections, yielding a total of 11,313 observations.  We used the BHPS rather than one of the cross sectional 
databases because it proved to be the only data set that could provide us with a sufficiently large number of 
observations on all of the variables needed to derive the cell weights: (1) whether the head of household was a 
previous owner; (2) date of purchase of dwelling; (3) price paid for dwelling; (4) value of outstanding mortgage debt; 
and (5) basic income of head of household.  
10An estimate of the current house value in the BHPS is obtained by inflating the original purchase price by the house 
price deflator for the region is which the house is located. The deflator was based on the Nationwide UK regional 
price index available from http://www.nationwide.co.uk/hpi/historical.htm.  
11 Like Follain and Melamed, we have held house value constant.  Removing the MID would, of course, reduce some 
combination of the price and quantity of housing demanded, leading to an even greater decline in mortgage debt.  The 




Because the household LTV response acts to offset the impact of removing the MID, a smaller response 
means a larger impact on housing demand and government tax revenue. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Given the non-taxation of income from owner-occupied housing, interest deductibility creates 
neutrality between debt and equity financing and renders the user cost of capital (through the WACC) 
independent of LTV choice.  Removing, fully or partially, deductibility creates a debt tax penalty and 
makes the user cost a positive function of leverage.  Thus the impact of changes in deductibility on housing 
choices, both tenure and quantity demanded, would depend on borrower sensitivity to the debt tax penalty.  
Estimating this sensitivity is the purpose of this paper. 
The UK gradually removed the home mortgage interest deduction during the 1974-99 period.  
During this period the penalty depended on whether the loan was above or below £30,000.  Thus we 
estimate a two-equation model determining both the tax penalty based on the probability of a loan being 
above £30,000 and the LTV itself. 
Explaining the LTV is complicated by the restraint that lenders place on the maximum value; 15 
percent of our UK loans have an LTV of exactly 95 percent.  Not only does this make the explanation 
tricky, but linear extrapolation of borrower responses to full interest deductibility is likely to lead to 
predictions of many borrowers having LTVs exceeding what we know to be the lender maximum.  We 
address these complications by considering three estimation methodologies: Ordinary Least Squares, 
Censored Regression and Fractional Logit Regression (FLR).  Only the latter restricts predicted LTVs to be 
less than a maximum. 
We analyze LTVs of 86,000 home purchasers with a mean LTV of 78 percent (based on a random 
sample of all new purchase loans).   The simulated responses vary widely based upon the age of the 
borrower and whether they are first-time or previous owners.  To illustrate, the FLR percentage declines for 
first-time owners are 7 and 16 for ages 25-34 and 45-54.   For previous owners, the comparable age 




in response to a shift from full interest deductibility to no deductibility ranges from 23 percent for Censored 
Regression to 17 percent for FLR.  The much lower FLR response is due to the constraint against simulated 
LTVs exceeding unity when full interest deductibility exists. 
These aggregate mortgage responses reflect our home buyer sample, in which first-time 
homeowners and younger buyers are far over represented relative to their distribution in the total 
homeowner population.  Computations based on the overall population, i.e., with far greater weight given 
to older, wealthier, previous owners, yields greater percentage declines in aggregate mortgage debt.  The 
Censored Regression decline is virtually identical to the economy-wide response simulated by Follain and 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  (i) London/SE 
N = 33,541 
(ii) Other Regions 
N = 53,079 
Variable Description 
Mean or 
Proportion Median CV 
Mean or 
Proportion  Median CV 
Age  Age of main borrower  34.65   32.00    0.08  34.50  32.00  0.08 
LTV  Loan to value ratio    0.77     0.87    0.08  0.79  0.90  0.07 
Income 
Basic income at 1990 prices 
(£000s) 15.94    13.01     0.49  12.03  10.13  0.42 
Other 
income. 
Other income at 1990 prices 
(£000s)    4.10   0.00    2.47 3.18  0.00  2.20 
Mortgage  Amount borrowed (£000s)    67.47    59.00  0.34  47.37 42.00  0.29 
Price  Purchase price (£000s)    94.28    76.00  0.45   63.87  53.75  0.37 
Dummies:                      
ceil  = 1 if mortgage amount is > £30K 0.90  -  -  0.77  -  - 
prev_oo  = 1 if a previous owner  0.54  -  -  0.51  -  - 
age_lt25  = 1 if age < 25  0.10  -  -  0.13  -  - 
age25_34  = 1 if aged 25 to 34  0.48  -  -  0.46  -  - 
age35_44  =1 if aged 35 to 44  0.26  -  -  0.25  -  - 
age45_54  =1 if aged 45 to 54  0.12  -  -  0.12  -  - 
age_gt54  =1 if age > 54  0.04  -  -  0.04  -  - 
incoth_d 
= 1if the borrower has income 
other than basic   0.46  -  -  0.48  -  - 
1996  = 1 if mortgage taken out in 1996 0.25  -  -  0.24  -  - 
1997  = 1 if mortgage taken out in 1997 0.31  -  -  0.29  -  - 
1998  = 1 if mortgage taken out in 1998 0.23  -  -  0.24  -  - 
LondSE 
= 1 if house is located in either 
London or S. East  1.00 -  - 0.00 - - 
Y.Hum 
= 1 if house is located in Yorshire 
or Humberside  0.00  -  -  0.14  -  - 
E.Mids 
= 1 if house is located in East 
Midlands  0.00 -  - 0.13 - - 
E.Ang. 
= 1 if house is located in East 
Anglia 0.00  -  -  0.07  -  - 
Lon.  = 1 if house is located in London 0.34  -  -  0.00  -  - 
S.East 
= 1 if house is located in South 
East  0.66 -  - 0.00 - - 
S.West 
= 1 if house is located in South 
West 0.00  -  -  0.17  -  - 
W.Mids 
= 1 if house is located in West 
Midlands  0.00 -  - 0.14 - - 
N.West 
= 1 if house is located in North 
West 0.00  -  -  0.16  -  - 
Scot. 
= 1 if house is located in 
Scotland  0.00 -  - 0.11 - - 
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Table 2: Cell Counts and Average LTVs:  
   (i) London/SE  (ii) Other Regions 
    
  











Age:    
  
Tax Rate:    
  
Tax Rate:    
  
Tax Rate:    
  
Tax Rate:    
      0.23-0.25  0.4  Total  0.23-0.25 0.4  Total  0.23-0.25 0.4  Total  0.23-0.25 0.4  Total 
                                         
<25  LTV   0.91  0.87    0.76  0.64    0.92  0.89    0.82  0.77   
   n  2,802  152  2,954  434  66  500  6,156  70  6,226  654  43  697 
   n as %  18.1%  1.0%    2.4%  0.4%    23.8% 0.3%   2.4% 0.2%  
                             
25-34  LTV   0.90  0.88    0.79  0.73    0.90  0.87    0.81  0.76   
   n  7,114  1,870  8,984  4,119  3,081  7,200  13,043  881  13,924  8,178  2,086  10,264
   n as %  45.9%  12.1%    22.8%  17.1%    50.5% 3.4%   30.0% 7.7%  
                             
35-44  LTV   0.86  0.85    0.69  0.66    0.86  0.84    0.71  0.68   
   n  1,695  838  2,533  2,610  3,442  6,052  3,233  649  3,882  6,062  3,218  9,280 
   n as %  10.9%  5.4%    14.5%  19.1%    12.5% 2.5%   22.2% 11.8%  
                             
45-54  LTV   0.82  0.79    0.56  0.55    0.81  0.79    0.58  0.57   
   n  586  253  839  1,552  1,571  3,123  1,172  258  1,430  3,321  1,787  5,108 
   n as %  3.8%  1.6%    8.6%  8.7%    4.5% 1.0%   12.2% 6.6%  
                             
>54  LTV   0.74  0.73    0.41  0.47    0.72  0.67    0.44  0.50   
   n  140  36  176  801  379  1,180  322  37  359  1,491  418  1,909 
   n as %  0.9%  0.2%    4.4%  2.1%    1.2% 0.1%   5.5% 1.5%  
Totals:   79.7%   20.3%    15,486  52.7%  47.3%  18,055  92.7  7.3%   25,821  72.3%  27.7%   27,258
                   33,541                 53,079 
LTV  represents the mean loan to value ratio in a cell. 
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Table 3.  LTV Regressions 
 
(i) London/SE 
 FTO  PO 
 OLS  CR  FLR  OLS  CR  FLR 
t_pen  -5.601  -7.175  -52.230 -11.344 -12.434 -61.765 
    (-15.0) (-14.8) (-17.1) (-11.3) (-11.5) (-12.4) 
inc.  0.012 0.015 0.113 0.018 0.019 0.108 
    (9.2) (9.3) (8.2) (5.1) (5.2) (5.8) 
inc.
2 -2.0E-04  -2.0E-04 -2.0E-03 -2.0E-04 2.0E-04  -1.6E-03 
    (-4.5) (-4.6) (-4.2) (-2.8) (-2.9) (-3.4) 
inc.
3  8.8E-07 1.0E-06 9.8E-06 6.6E-07 7.1E-07 5.9E-06 
    (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (1.4) (1.5) (2.0) 
O.inc.  0.006 0.007 0.053 0.010 0.012 0.054 
    (10.8)  (8.5) (9.2) (7.4) (7.6) (7.4) 
O.inc.
2 -3.0E-04  -4.0E-04 -2.7E-03 -4.0E-04 2.4E-06  -1.8E-03 
    (-6.8) (-4.9) (-5.2) (-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.3) 
O.inc.
3  2.7E-06 3.4E-06 2.6E-05 2.2E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 
    (5.1) (3.0) (3.0) (1.6) (1.6) (1.5) 
age  -0.001 -0.002 -0.036 -0.010 -0.012 -0.066 
    (-0.6) (-1.9) (-4.7) (-7.7) (-9.5)  (-10.2) 
age
2 -5.0E-05  -3.0E-05 3.0E-05  -9.2E-06 1.0E-05  2.0E-04 
   (-3.1)  (-2.0)  (0.3)  (-0.6)  (0.9)  (2.9) 
1996  -0.017 -0.021 -0.145 -0.044 -0.046 -0.246 
    (-6.3) (-5.6) (-5.3) (-6.9) (-6.6) (-7.9) 
1997  -0.024 -0.029 -0.223 -0.039 -0.043 -0.210 
    (-8.5) (-7.5) (-8.4) (-7.6) (-7.6) (-8.1) 
1998  -0.056 -0.060 -0.510 -0.041 -0.043 -0.211 
   (-18.3)  (-15.1)  (-18.7)  (-8.1)  (-7.9)  (-8.4) 
S.East 0.009 0.013 0.090 0.029 0.033 0.141 
    (4.8) (4.7) (4.7) (8.0) (8.3) (8.0) 
Const. 0.952 1.032 3.128 1.059 1.151 2.967 
    (53.1) (48.6) (22.5) (44.2) (43.2) (19.2) 
            
N  15,486 15,486 15,486 18,055 18,055 18,055 
Adj.R
2  0.122 -  - 0.235 -  - 
LL  11,623 1,367 -4,108 2,523 -1,195 -7,954 
AIC  - 23,200  -2,704  8,244  -5,018  2420  15,936 
All figures in parentheses are t-ratios derived from bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 repetitions. 
“LL” stands for log-likelihood.  4
(ii) Other  Regions 
 
 FTO  PO 
  OLS CR FLR  OLS CR FLR 
t_pen  -5.892  -7.506  -53.458 -13.497 -14.983 -69.492 
    (-12.7) (-12.5) (-13.9) (-32.4) (-34.3) (-35.4) 
inc.  0.009 0.011 0.081 0.031 0.034 0.162 
   (5.2)  (4.8)  (4.2)  (23.3)  (22.3)  (34.2) 
inc.
2  -1.0E-04 -1.0E-04 -9.0E-04 -6.0E-04 -6.0E-04 -3.0E-03 
   (-1.6)  (-1.4)  (-1.2)  (-13.5)  (-12.7)  (-22.4) 
inc.
3  2.9E-07 3.5E-07 2.4E-06 2.7E-06 3.0E-06 2.0E-05 
    (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (8.5) (8.0)  (15.1) 
O.inc.  0.009 0.010 0.093 0.012 0.013 0.070 
   (11.2)  (8.6)  (12.5)  (8.5)  (8.3)  (9.7) 
O.inc.
2  -6.0E-04 -1.0E-03 -6.4E-03 -4.0E-04 -1.0E-03 -2.9E-03 
    (-5.9) (-4.6) (-6.6) (-3.4) (-3.3) (-4.3) 
O.inc.
3  6.9E-06 8.2E-06 1.0E-04 3.6E-06 3.8E-06 3.0E-05 
    (3.1) (2.3) (3.4) (1.9) (1.8) (2.6) 
age  -0.002 -0.004 -0.048 -0.017 -0.022 -0.113 
   (-2.0)  (-3.8)  (-8.5)  (-19.1)  (-21.5)  (-23.9) 
age
2 -3.9E-05  -2.1E-05 1.2E-04 6.6E-05 1.1E-04 6.6E-04 
   (-3.3)  (-1.8)  (1.7)  (6.2)  (8.9)  (12.4) 
1996  -0.015 -0.015 -0.132 -0.043 -0.045 -0.218 
   (-6.8)  (-4.6)  (-5.6)  (-11.2)  (-10.0)  (-11.3) 
1997  -0.016 -0.015 -0.146 -0.023 -0.023 -0.111 
    (-7.7) (-5.0) (-6.9) (-6.2) (-5.6) (-6.0) 
1998  -0.040 -0.038 -0.377 -0.011 -0.006 -0.047 
    (-17.3) (-11.9) (-17.2)  (-2.8)  (-1.3)  (-2.5) 
Y.Hum  0.007 0.006 0.068 0.004 0.004 0.022 
    (2.1) (1.3) (2.0) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) 
E.Mids  0.001 -0.004 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.011 
    (0.4) (-0.8) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) 
N.West  0.011 0.006 0.114 0.003 0.002 0.018 
  (3.6) (1.4) (3.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.6) 
Scot. -0.002  -0.007  -0.022  0.008  0.005  0.046 
 (-0.5)  (-1.3)  (-0.6)  (1.4)  (0.8)  (1.5) 
W.Mid  -0.001 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011 -0.043 
  (-0.3) (-2.2) (-0.4) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-1.5) 
S.West  -0.004 -0.012 -0.042 -0.005 -0.006 -0.016 
    (-1.2) (-2.5) (-1.2) (-0.8) (-1.0) (-0.6) 
E.Ang. -0.005  -0.011  -0.058  0.003  0.004  0.021 
   (-1.4)  (-2.1)  (-1.5)  (0.4)  (0.6)  (0.6) 
Const.  1.003 1.111 3.688 1.205 1.334 3.906 
    (64.2) (54.3) (27.9) (62.7) (60.8) (37.6) 
N  25,821 25,821 25,821 27,258 27,258 27,258 
Adj.R
2  0.122 -  - 0.276 -  - 
LL  19,689 1,323 -6,643 4,653 -1901  -11,600 
AIC  -39,300 -2,604 13,325 -9,267  3,844  23,170 
 All figures in parentheses are t-ratios derived from bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 repetitions. 
“LL” stands for log-likelihood.Table 4.  Percentage Decline in LTV Due to a Shift from Full to Zero Interest 
Deductibility 
 
   London/SE  Other Regions 
    FTO  PO  FTO  PO 
Age:     0.23-0.25  0.4  0.23-0.25 0.4  0.23-0.25 0.4  0.23-0.25  0.4 
<25  OLS  10  17  20  32  11  17  22  33 
   CR  12  20  21  33  13  20  23  35 
   FLR  7  11  13  20  7  9  11  15 
                     
25-34  OLS  10  17  21  33  11  18  23  35 
   CR  12  20  22  34  13  21  24  37 
   FLR  8  13  15  23  8  13  14  20 
                     
35-44  OLS  11  18  24  36  11  18  26  39 
   CR  13  21  25  38  13  22  28  41 
   FLR  11  16  22  31  11  16  22  29 
                     
45-54  OLS  12  19  28  41  12  19  31  43 
   CR  14  22  30  43  15  23  33  46 
   FLR  15  21  32  42  16  21  33  41 
                     
>54  OLS  13  20  37  48  13  20  39  49 
   CR  15  24  39  51  16  24  42  52 
   FLR  21  29  43  51  22  25  44  50 




Table 5.  Cell Weights 
 
(a)  CML Cell Weights 
 
 FTO  PO 
Age:  0.23-0.25  0.4  0.23-0.25  0.4 
<35 0.336  0.034  0.155  0.061 
35-44 0.057  0.017  0.100  0.077 




(b)  BHPS Cell Weights 
 
 FTO  PO 
Age:  0.23-0.25  0.4  0.23-0.25  0.4 
<35 0.003  0.009  0.012  0.217 
35-44 0.001  0.003  0.005  0.309 






Table 6: Percent Decline in Aggregate Mortgage Debt 
  CML Weights  BHPS Weights 
OLS 21  39 
CR 23  41 
FLR 17  32 








Consider first the order conditions of our system of simultaneous equations comprised of 
equations (3) and (4’) in the text.  Following Maddala (1992, p.360), let g be the number of endogenous 
variables in the system, and let k be the total number of variables (endogenous and exogenous) missing 
from the equation in question.  For equation (3) we can see that k = 1, and for equation (4’) k = 0.  If k = g 
–1, the equation is said to be exactly identified, whereas if k is greater (less) than g – 1, then the equation 
in question is said to be over (under) identified.  Because we have two endogenous variables in the system 
(LTV and p
C) g = 2, and equation (3) is exactly identified according to the order condition, but equation 
(4’) is under identified. 
Now consider the rank rule for identification.  This rule says that if we represent our system of 
equations as a matrix (with the columns designating variables and the rows representing equations), and if 
we place zeros in the columns where variables are not included in a particular equation and ones where 
variables are included, then if we delete the row of the equation in question and make a new matrix from 
the rows and columns that correspond to the zeros in the equation in question, we would need at least g –1 
rows and columns in this new matrix that are not all zeros for the equation in question to be identified (i.e. 
either over or exactly identified).  If we cannot find g –1 rows and columns that are not all zeros, then the 
equation is not identified (i.e. under identified).  Because we only have two equations in our system, the 
rank rule is trivial.  The matrix of variables is as follows: 
Equation LTV  p




i,   AGEi  DUMi 
(3) 1  1  0  1  1  1  1 1 
(4’) 1 1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 
Applying the rank rule to equation (3), because there is only one zero, we are left a second matrix of one 
element that is non zero, with row and column dimensions = 1, which equals g –1.  So according to both 




Appendix: Table B1: Probit Results 
(Dependent variable = ceil) 
 
   London/SE   Other Regions 
PO -0.424  -0.193 
   (-11.8)  (-8.3) 
Income 0.048  0.082 
   (12.8)  (18.3) 
other.income 0.027  0.073 
   (7.5)  (22.8) 
other income dummy 0.395  0.293 
   (11.6)  (13.1) 
age < 25  -0.361  -0.287 
   (-2.8)  (-3.4) 
age 25 to 34  0.946  0.484 
   (11.6)  (7.2) 
age 35 to 44  1.112  0.899 
   (14.9)  (13.7) 
age 45 to 54  0.373  0.664 
   (4.8)  (10.1) 
inc. * (age < 25)  0.168  0.173 
   (12.1)  (18.9) 
inc. * (age 25 to 34)  0.034  0.085 
   (6.3)  (15.0) 
inc. * (age 35 to 44)  0.004  0.018 
   (0.7)  (3.5) 
inc. * (age 45 to 54)  0.015  -0.012 
   (2.9)  (-2.4) 
PO * (age < 25)  -0.052  0.206 
   (-0.6)  (3.1) 
PO * (age 25 to 34)  0.084  0.148 
   (1.6)  (4.5) 
1996 0.001  0.034 
   (0.0)  (1.8) 
1997 0.053  0.130 
   (1.8)  (6.9) 
1998 0.059  0.118 
   (1.8)  (5.9) 
S.East -0.115  - 
   (-4.8)  - 
Y.Hum -  0.244 
   -  (8.5) 
E.Mids -  0.263 






N.West -  0.305 
  - (10.8) 
Scot. -  0.253 
  - (8.3) 
W.Mid -  0.430 
  - (14.5) 
S.West -  0.555 
   -  (19.2) 
E.Ang. -  0.411 
   -  (12.0) 
Const. -0.405  -1.802 
   (-5.7)  (-27.9) 
N  33,541   53,079  
LL -8,568  -21,700 
Chi
2 5,270  14,000 
AIC 17,176  43,418 




Appendix: Table B2: Tax Penalty (Above and Below) Regressions 
 
(Dependent Variable: tax_pen = the actual tax penalty) 
 
    London/SE   Other Regions 
tax_above 0.999  0.986 
   (576.4)  (446.5) 
tax_below 0.939  0.881 
   (130.4)  (135.2) 
Const. 0.000 0.000 
   (2.3)  (0.0) 
        
N   33,541    53,079  
Adj R
2 0.911 0.817 
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Observations which OLS will 














Figure 5 LTV Kernel Density Plots for Full Deductibility  
 
 
 